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Abstract—Network slicing to enable resource sharing among
multiple tenants –network operators and/or services– is consid-
ered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks.
This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for
resource sharing, the ‘share-constrained proportional allocation’
mechanism, to realize network slicing. This mechanism enables
tenants to reap the performance benefits of sharing, while
retaining the ability to customize their own users’ allocation. This
results in a network slicing game in which each tenant reacts
to the user allocations of the other tenants so as to maximize
its own utility. We show that, under appropriate conditions, the
game associated with such strategic behavior converges to a Nash
equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, a tenant always achieves
the same, or better, performance than under a static partitioning
of resources, hence providing the same level of protection as such
static partitioning. We further analyze the efficiency and fairness
of the resulting allocations, providing tight bounds for the price of
anarchy and envy-freeness. Our analysis and extensive simulation
results confirm that the mechanism provides a comprehensive
practical solution to realize network slicing. Our theoretical
results also fill a gap in the literature regarding the analysis
of this resource allocation model under strategic players.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is consensus among the relevant industry and stan-
dardization communities [1], [2] that a key element in 5G
mobile networks will be network slicing. The idea is to
allow the mobile infrastructure to be “sliced” into logical
networks, which are operated by different entities and may be
tailored to support specific services. This provides a basis for
efficient infrastructure sharing among diverse entities, ranging
from classical or virtual mobile network operators to new
players that simply view connectivity as a service. Such new
players could be, for instance, Over-The-Top (OTT) service
providers which use a network slice to ensure satisfactory
service to their customers (e.g., Amazon Kindle’s support
for downloading content or a pay TV channel including a
premium subscription). In the literature, the term tenant is
often used to refer to the owner of a network slice.
A network slice is a collection of resources and functions
that are orchestrated to support a specific service. This includes
software modules running at different locations as well as the
nodes’ computational resources, and communication resources
in the backhaul and radio network. The intention is to only
provide what is necessary for the service, avoiding unneces-
sary overheads and complexity. Thus, network slices enable
tenants to compete with each other using the same physical
infrastructure, but customizing their slices and network oper-
ation according to their market segment’s characteristics and
requirements. For instance, slices can be geared at supporting
various IoT or M2M applications, such as the connectivity
required to realize ‘intelligent’ vehicular systems.
A key problem underlying network slicing is enabling
efficient sharing of mobile network resources. One of the ap-
proaches considered in 3GPP suggests that resources could be
statically partitioned based on fixed ‘network shares’ [3]. How-
ever, given that slices’ loads may be spatially inhomogenous
and time varying, it is desirable to allow resource allocations
to be ‘elastic’, e.g., dependent on the slices’ loads at different
base stations. At the same time, tenants should be protected
from one another, and retain the ability to autonomously
manage their slice’s resources, in order to better customize al-
locations to their customers. To that end, it is desirable to adopt
resource allocation models in which tenants can communicate
their preferences to the infrastructure (say by dynamically
subdividing their network share amongst their customers) and
then have base stations’ resources allocated according to their
preferences (i.e., proportionally to the customers’ shares).
Under such a dynamic resource allocation model, a tenant
might exhibit strategic behavior, by adjusting its preferences
depending on perceived congestion at resources, so as to max-
imize its own utility. Such behavior could in turn have adverse
effects on the network; for instance, the overall efficiency may
be harmed, or one may see instability in slice requests. The
focus of this paper is on (i) the analysis and performance of
this simple resource allocation model, and (ii) the validation
of its feasibility as a means to enable tenants to customize
resource allocation within their slice while protecting them
from one another.
Related work: The resource allocation mechanism infor-
mally described above corresponds to a Fisher market, which
is a standard framework in economics. In such markets,
buyers (in our case slices) have fixed budgets (in our case
network shares) and (according to their preferences) bid for
resources within their budget, which are then allocated to
buyers proportionally to their bids. Analysis of the Fisher
market shows that, as long as buyers are price-taking (i.e.,
they do not anticipate the impact of their bids on the price
– in our case, the impact of the slices’ preferences on the
overall congestion), the Nash equilibrium is socially optimal,
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
08
44
6v
4 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
9 F
eb
 20
17
and distributed algorithms can be easily devised to reach it [4].
This assumption may be reasonable for markets where the
impact of a single buyer on a resource’s price is negligible,
but does not apply to our case where a relatively small number
of active tenants might be sharing resources.
There is a substantial literature on Fisher markets with
strategic buyers, which, as will be studied in this paper,
anticipate the impact of their bids [5]. The analysis, so far, has
been limited to the case of buyers with linear utility functions
of the allocated resources, which can lead to extremely unfair
allocations. While such utility functions may be suitable for
goods, they are not an appropriate model for tenants wishing
to customize allocations amongst their customers. This paper
includes a comprehensive analysis for a wide set of slice
utility functions, including the convergence of best response
dynamics and other results which to our knowledge are new.
A related resource allocation model often considered in the
networking field is the so-called ‘Kelly’s mechanism’ [6]; this
mechanism allocates resources to players proportionally to
their bids and, assuming that they are price-taking, converges
to a social optimum. Follow-up work has considered price-
anticipating players in this setting; for example, [7] ana-
lyze efficiency losses, while [8] devise a scalar-parametrized
modification that is once again socially optimal for price-
anticipating players. However, in Kelly’s mechanism players
respond to their payoff (given by the utility minus cost)
whereas in our model tenants’ behavior is only driven by their
utilities (since they have a fixed budget: the network share).
Consequently, results on the analysis of Kelly’s mechanism
are not applicable to our setting.
Table I capture the main resource allocation models for this
problem highlighting some of the most relevant work for each
problem and situating the contribution of this work.
price taking price anticipating
scalar bid scalar bid vector bid
non [6] Kelly’s VCG-Kelly mechanism Johari/Tsitsiklis
fixed mechanism [8] Hajek/Yang [7] Efficiency of
budget (conv, efficiency) [9] Johari/Tsitsiklis congestion games
concave utilities linear utilities concave utilities
fixed [4] Zhang [5] Zhang This work
budget (convergence) (conv, efficiency) (conv, efficiency)
TABLE I: Resource allocation models.
From a more practical angle, multi-tenant sharing has been
studied from different points of view, including planning,
economics, coverage, performance, etc. [10], [11]. This paper
focuses specifically on the design of algorithms for resource
sharing among tenants, which has been previously addressed
by [12]–[15]. The work of [15] considers sharing via a bid-
based auction, which may incur substantial overhead and
complexity; in contrast, our approach relies on fixed (pre-
negotiated) network shares. The works of [12]–[14] also fix a
network share per slice, but consider approaches where the
infrastructure makes centralized decisions on the resources
allocated to each tenant’s customers; hence, these approaches
do not enable tenants to make their own decisions on how to
allocate resources to their customers.
Network slicing has emerged as a desirable feature for
5G [1]. 3GPP has started work on defining requirements for
network slicing [2], whereas the Next Generation Mobile
Network (NGMN) alliance has identified network sharing
among slices (the focus of this paper) as a key issue [16]. In
spite of these efforts, most of the work so far has addressed
architectural aspects with only a limited focus on resource
allocation algorithms [17], [18]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work investigating how to enable tenants to
customize their allocations in a dynamic slicing model.
Key contributions: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. After introducing our system model (Section II), we
show that with the resource sharing model under study, each
slice has the ability to achieve the same or better utility than
under static resource slicing irrespective of how the other slices
behave, which confirms that this model effectively protects
slices from one another (Section III-A). Next we show that if
tenants exhibit strategic behavior (i.e, optimize their utilities),
then (i) a Nash equilibrium exists under mild conditions; and
(ii) the system converges to such an equilibrium when tenants
sequentially take their best response (Sections III-B and III-C).
The resulting efficiency and fairness among tenants are then
studied, providing: (i) a tight bound on the Price of Anarchy of
the system, and (ii) a bound on the Envy-freeness (Section IV).
Our results are validated via simulation, confirming that the
approach provides substantial gains, protects network slices
from each other, operates close to optimal performance and is
effectively envy-free (Section V).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless network consisting of a set of
resources B (the base stations or sectors) shared by a set of
network slices O (the tenants). At a given point in time, the
network supports a set of users U (the customers or devices),
which can be subdivided into subsets Ub (the users at base
station b), Uo (the users of slice o) and Uob (their intersection).
We further assume that a user u ∈ U has a mean peak capacity
cu depending on the choice of modulation and coding at the
base station it is associated with. For any user u, we let b(u)
denote the base station it is currently associated with.
A. Resource allocation model
As indicated in the introduction, we focus on a well estab-
lished resource sharing model known in economics as a Fisher
market. Hereafter, we will refer to this model as the ‘Share-
Constrained Proportional Allocation’ (SCPA) mechanism.
In our setting, each slice o is allocated a network share so
(corresponding to its budget) such that
∑
o∈O so = 1. The
slice is at liberty in turn to distribute its share amongst its
users, assigning them weights (corresponding to the bids): wu
for u ∈ Uo, such that∑u∈Uo wu = so. We let wo = (wu : u ∈Uo) be the weights of slice o, w = (wu : u ∈ U) those of all
slices and w−o = (wu : u ∈ U \ Uo) the weights of all users
excluding those of slice o.
We shall assume users are allocated a fraction of resources
at their base station proportionally to their weights wu. Thus
the rate of user u is given by
ru(w) =
wu∑
v∈Ub(u) wv
cu =
wu
lb(u)(w)
cu
where lb(w) =
∑
u∈Ub wu denotes the overall load at b (recall
that cu is the achievable rate if the user had the entire base
station to itself).
To implement the above resource allocation, a slice needs to
communicate the weights of its users wo to the infrastructure.
When selecting its weights, we assume that the slice is aware
of the overall load at each base station (indeed, a slice could
infer these by varying its users’ weights and observing the
resulting resource allocations).1
In the case where a slice o is the only one with users at a
given base station b, we shall assume that the slice’s users are
allocated the entire capacity at that base station independent
of their weights. Thus such a slice would set wu = 0 for these
users, allowing them to receive all the resources of this base
station without consuming any share. In order to avoid dealing
with this special case, and without loss of generality, we will
make the following assumption for the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1. (Competition at all resources) We assume that
all resources have active users from at least two slices.
B. Network Slice Utility and Service Differentiation
Network slices may support services and customers of
different types and needs. Alternatively, competing slices with
similar customer types may wish to differentiate the service
they provide. To that end, we assume each network slice has
a private utility that reflects the benefit obtained by the slice
from a given allocation and is given by
Uo(w) =
∑
u∈Uo
φufu(ru(w)),
where φu is the relative priority of user u, with φu ≥ 0
and
∑
u∈Uo φu = 1, and fu(·) is a (concave) utility function
associated with the user. In the sequel, we will often focus on
the following well-known class of utility functions [19].
Definition 1. A network slice o has a homogenous αo-fair
utility if for all u ∈ Uo we have that
fu(ru) =
{
(ru)
1−αo
(1−αo) , αo 6= 1
log(ru), αo = 1.
Thus, in our setting, a slice is free to choose different
fairness criteria in allocating resources across its users, by
selecting the appropriate αo parameter. Note that αo = 1 cor-
responds to the widely accepted proportional fairness criterion,
1It is worth noting that, with the SCPA mechanism under study, the weights
of a given tenant are not disclosed to the others, which only see the overall
load at each base station.
while αo = 2 corresponds to potential delay fairness, αo →∞
to max-min fairness and αo = 0 to linear sum utility.
A slice can also ‘strategically’ optimize the weight alloca-
tion of its users to maximize its own utility. We will consider
such strategic behavior of weight allocations in Section III.
C. Baseline allocations
Next we introduce two natural resource allocation compar-
ative baselines: socially optimal allocations and static slicing.
a) Socially Optimal Allocations (SO): If slices were to
share their utility functions with a centralized authority, one
could in principle consider a socially optimal allocation of
weights and resources. These would be given by the maximizer
to the overall network utility U(w) given by (see [14]):
max
w≥0
U(w) :=
∑
o∈O
soU
o(w)
s.t. ru(w) =
wu
lb(u)(w)
cu, ∀u ∈ U∑
u∈Uo
wu = so, ∀o ∈ O.
Note that (as in [14]) we have weighted the slices’ utilities to
reflect their shares (thus prioritizing those with higher shares).
We shall denote the resulting optimal weight and resource
allocations under the socially optimal allocations by w∗ and
r∗ = (r∗u : u ∈ U), respectively.
b) Static Slicing (SS): By static slicing (also known as
static splitting [20]) we refer to a complete partitioning of
resources based on the network shares so, o ∈ O. In this
setting, each slice o receives a fixed fraction so of each
resource and can unilaterally optimize its weight allocation
as follows:
max
w0≥0
Uo(wo) =
∑
u∈Uo
φufu(ru(w
o))
s.t. ru(wo) =
wu∑
v∈Uo
b(u)
wv
socu ∀u ∈ Uo∑
u∈Uo
wu = so,
where we have abused notation to indicate that, in this case,
Uo and ru depend only on wo. We shall denote the resulting
optimal weight and resource allocations under static slicing
for all slices by wss and rss = (rssu : u ∈ U) respectively,
where
rssu =
wssu∑
v∈Uo
b(u)
wssv
socu ∀u ∈ Uo,∀o ∈ O. (1)
III. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Under the SCPA resource allocation model, it is reasonable
to assume that a player (network slice) would choose to adjust
its weights so as to optimize its utility (and thus the service
delivered to its customers). Since the resources allocated to a
user depend on the weight allocations of the other slices, such
behavior would be predicated on the aggregate weight of the
other slices at each resource. From the point of view of slice
o, the overall load at resource b can be decomposed as
lb(w) = a
o
b(w
−o) + dob(w
o)
where
aob(w
−o) =
∑
o′∈O\{o}
∑
u∈Uo′b
wu and dob(w
o) =
∑
u∈Uob
wu,
correspond to the aggregate weight of the other slices and that
of slice o, respectively. As indicated in Section II, we assume
ao(w−o) = (aob(w−o) : b ∈ B) are readily available to slice o.
A. Gain over Static Slicing
We first analyze if strategic behavior on the part of network
slices may result in allocations that are worse that those under
static slicing. Note that static slicing provides complete iso-
lation among slices but potentially poor utilization. A critical
question is whether dynamic sharing, which achieves a higher
resource utilization, also provides the same level of protection.
This is confirmed by the following result.
Lemma 1. Consider slice o and any feasible weight allocation
w−o for other slices satisfying the network share constraints.
Then, there exists a weight allocation wo for slice o, possibly
dependent on w−o, such that the resulting weight allocation
w satisfies ru(w) ≥ rssu for all u ∈ Uo .
This lemma is easily shown by choosing wo such that
wu =
wssu∑
u∈Uo
b(u)
wssu
aob(u)(w
−o)∑
b′∈Bo a
o
b′(w−o)
so, ∀u ∈ Uo
where Bo is the set of base stations where slice o has users. The
intuitive interpretation for this choice is that by distributing its
weights proportionally to the load at each base station, slice
o can achieve the same resource allocation as static slicing at
each base station. Further, by redistributing these allocations
amongst its user in the same manner as static slicing, it
achieves at least as much rate per user.
It follows immediately from this lemma that under the SCPA
resource allocation model, if all slices exhibit strategic be-
havior attempting to maximize their utilities, they necessarily
achieve a higher utility than under static slicing.
Theorem 1. If the game where each network slice maximizes
its utility has a Nash equilibrium, then each slice achieves a
higher utility than under static slicing.
Note this result does not require slices to have homogenous
or concave utilities, just that they be increasing in the users’
rate allocations.
B. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Next we study whether there exists a Nash equilibrium (NE)
under which no slice can benefit by unilaterally changing its
weight allocation. To that end, we first characterize the best
response of a slice.
Given the weights of the other slices, w−o, the best response
of slice o is the unique maximizer wo of its utility, i.e.,
max
w′o≥0
∑
u∈Uo
φufu
(
w′ucu
aob(u)(w
−o) + dob(u)(w
′o)
)
s.t
∑
u∈Uo
w′u = so.
The following lemma characterizes the best response for a
network slice with homogenous αo-fair utility (see [5] for the
best response when αo = 0).
Lemma 2. Suppose slice o has a homogeneous αo-fair utility
(with αo > 0). Given the weights of the other slices w−o >
0, slice o’s best response wo is the unique solution to the
following nonlinear set of equations:
wu =
βu
(aob(u)(w
−o))
1
αo(
ao
b(u)
(w−o)+do
b(u)
(wo)
) 2
αo
−1
∑
v∈Uo
βv
(
ao
b(v)
(w−o)
) 1
αo(
ao
b(v)
(w−o)+do
b(v)
(wo)
) 2
αo
−1
so, ∀u ∈ Uo, (2)
where βu := (φu)
1
αo (cu)
1
αo
−1.
Note that slice o need only know ao(w−o) to compute
its best response. Building on this characterization, we will
study the game in which all slices choose to allocate their
weights based on their best response. The following theorem
proves that this game admits a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there is
a weight allocation w such that no slice can improve its utility
by modifying its weights unilaterally.2
Theorem 2. Suppose all slices have homogenous αo-fair
utilities (with possibly different αo > 0). Then, there exists
a (not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium satisfying (2) for
each slice.
The proof of this result is technical and been relegated to the
Appendix. The argument proceeds as follows. We consider a
perturbed game where an additional slice assigns a weight ε at
each base station. For this perturbed game, we have concave
utilities and compact strategy spaces such that the result of
[21] gives existence of a Nash equilibrium.3 We then consider
a sequence of such equilibria as ε → 0. By compactness of
the strategy space it must have a converging subsequence. One
can further show that the weight allocations for the perturbed
equilibria have uniform positive lower bounds, so the limit of
the converging subsequence also has positive weights. Note
that (as it can be seen from Lemma 2) slice o’s best response in
the perturbed game wo is a continuous differentiable function
of w−o as long as w−o > 0. It then follows by continuity that
the limit of the converging subsequence is a Nash equilibrium.
2The existence of a NE had already been proven by [4] for the case αo =
0 ∀o. Here we extend this result to any combination of αo values.
3In particular, [21] shows by applying the Kakutani fixed point theorem
that there exists a solution to the equations defining a Nash equilibrium. Note
that in the case of users with log utilities, the function is not defined for a
weight of 0 and hence the conditions of [21] are not satisfied; however, a
careful reading of the proof of [21] shows the result still applies.
C. Convergence of Best Response Dynamics
Below we will consider a best response game wherein slices
realize their best responses in rounds; specifically, they update
their weights (wo) sequentially, one at a time and in the same
fixed order, in response to the other slices’ weights (ao).
Theorem 3. If slices have homogeneous αo-fair utilities,
possibly with different αo ∈ [1, 2] for o ∈ O, then the best
response game converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Note that the value of αo impacts a slice’s best response
and consequently the game dynamics. As seen in Lemma 2,
the best response weights are proportional to:
wu ∝ g(aob , dob) :=
(aob)
1
αo
(aob + d
o
b)
2
αo
−1 ,
where we have suppressed the dependency of aob on w
−o
and dob on w
o. The function g(·, ·) has different properties
depending on αo which are shown in Table II. The regime
where 1 ≤ αo ≤ 2, considered in Theorem 3, is of particular
interest since it includes proportional (αo = 1) and potential
delay (αo = 2) fairness. It is known that convergence is
not ensured when αo = 0 for all slices (see [5]); for other
regimes, we resort to the simulations results of Section V,
which suggest convergence for any αo > 0.
αo = 0 0 < αo < 1 1 ≤ αo ≤ 2 2 < αo <∞
g w.r.t. dob linear convex convex concave
g w.r.t. aob linear convex concave concave
NE existence X [5] XTheorem 2 for heterogeneous αo
convergence × [5] Xsimulations XTheorem 3 Xsimulations
TABLE II: Impact of αo on slice’s Best Responses.
Perhaps surprisingly, the above result is quite challenging to
show. The key challenge lies in the “price-anticipating” aspect
of the best response, in which players anticipate the impact of
their own allocation.4 The rest of this section is a sketch of
the proof for this result.
We shall denote time as slotted {0, 1, ..., t, ...} and assume
a single slice makes an update each time slot. Without loss of
generality, we will index slices {1, 2, ..., |O|} = O according
to their updating order in a round. We let w(t) = (wo(t) : o ∈
O) be the weights of all slices at the end the time slot t update,
where wo(t) = (wu(t) : u ∈ Uo). Suppose that slices have
arbitrary positive initial weight vectors at time zero denoted
w(0) = (w1(0),w2(0), ...,w|O|(0)). Consequently, slice 1
will update its weights at time slots: {1, |O|+1, ..., r ·|O|+1},
corresponding to rounds {0, 1, ..., r, ...}.
We will further define ∆wo(t+1) = (∆wu(t+1): u ∈ Uo),
where ∆wo(t+ 1) = (∆wu(t+ 1): u ∈ Uo) such that,
wu(t+ 1) = wu(t)(1 + ∆wu(t+ 1)), ∀o ∈ O, u ∈ Uo
4Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, there are very few results in the
literature on the convergence of price-anticipating best response dynamics.
where 1+∆wu(t+1) captures the relative change in slice o’s
weight update at time slot t + 1. Furthermore, to capture the
overall changes in slices weights at the end of each round, we
shall define ω(0) = w(0), ω(r) = (ωo(r) : o ∈ O) where
ωo(r) = wo(r · |O| + 1) and ∆ωo(r) such that ∆ω(r) =
(∆ωou(r) : u ∈ Uo). For all o ∈ O, we define
∆ωo(r) := max
u∈Uo
∆ωou(r), ∆ω
o(r) := min
u∈Uo
∆ωou(r).
The key step in our convergence proof is the following
lemma – see the appendix for a detailed proof.
Lemma 3. If the game has not converged to a Nash equilib-
rium, i.e. ∆ω(r) 6= 0 for r > 1, then:
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1)
)
<
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r)
)
.
The above lemma suggests that when slices have not
reached an equilibrium, then in the next round
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1)
)
will decrease. This in turn suggests that maximum and min-
imum components of the vector of relative changes, 1 +
∆ω(r), are getting closer to 1.
With this result in hand, one can show the existence of
a Lyapunov function guaranteeing convergence of the best
response game, thus completing the proof of Theorem 3 –
see Appendix for a detailed proof.
IV. PERFORMANCE BOUNDS ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the performance of the Nash
equilibrium in terms of two standard metrics for efficiency
and fairness: (i) the price of anarchy, which gives the loss
in overall utility resulting from slices’ strategic behavior, and
(ii) envy-freeness, which captures the degree to which a slice
would prefer another slice’s allocations across the network
resources. We will focus on the case where slice utilities are 1-
fair homogeneous i.e., Uo(w) =
∑
u∈Uo φu log(ru(w)) ∀o ∈
O – a widely accepted case leading to the well-known pro-
portionally fair allocations.
A. Efficiency: Price of Anarchy
The following result characterizes the socially optimal allo-
cation of resources defined in Section II-C (see [22]).
Fact 1. For slices with 1-fair homogenous utilities, the so-
cially optimal allocation of resources w∗ is such that w∗u =
φuso, ∀u ∈ Uo and ∀o ∈ O.
The following theorem bounds the difference between the
overall network utility resulting from the socially optimal
allocation, U(w∗), and that obtained at a Nash equilibrium
of the SCPA resource allocation mechanism, U(w) – a sketch
of the proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. If all slices have 1-fair homogenous utilities, then
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) associated with a Nash equilibrium
w satisfies
PoA := U(w∗)− U(w) ≤ log(e).
Furthermore, there exists a game instance for which this bound
is tight.
Note that, with 1-fair utilities, if we increase the capacity
of all resources by a factor ∆c, we have a utility increase
of log(∆c). Thus, the performance improvement achieved by
the socially optimal allocation over SCPA is (in the upper
bound) equivalent to having a capacity e times larger, i.e.,
almost the triple capacity. While there are some (pathological)
cases in which such a bound can be achieved, our simulation
results show that for practical scenarios the actual performance
difference between the two allocations is much smaller, con-
firming that (for αo = 1) the flexibility gained with the SCPA
mechanism comes at a very small price in performance.
B. Fairness: Envy-freeness
Next we consider a Nash equilibrium w and analyze
whether a slice, say o, with utility Uo(w), might have a better
utility if it were to exchange its resources with those of another
slice, say o′. To that end, we denote by w˜ the resulting weight
allocation when the users of slices o and o′ exchange their
allocated resources. It is easy to see that w˜o is such that
w˜ou =
φu∑
v∈Uob φv
do
′
b (w) for all b ∈ B and all u ∈ Uob , (3)
i.e., slice o takes the aggregate weight of o′ at base station b
under the Nash equilibrium, do
′
b (w), and allocates it propor-
tionally to its user priorities. Clearly, w˜o
′
is defined similarly
and the remaining slices weights remain unchanged under w˜.
We define the envy of slice o for o′’s resources under the
Nash equilibrium w by
Eo,o
′
:= Uo(w˜)− Uo(w).
Note that envy is a “directed” concept, i.e., it is defined from
slice o’s point of view. When Eo,o
′ ≤ 0, we say slice o is not
envious. The following theorem provides a bound on Eo,o
′
–
see the Appendix for a sketch of the proof.
Theorem 5. Consider a slice o with 1-fair homogeneous
utilities and the remaining slices O \ {o} with arbitrary slice
utilities. Consider a slice o′ such that so = so′ . Let w denote
a Nash equilibrium and w˜ denote the resulting weights when
o and o′ exchange their resources. Then, the envy of slice o
for o′ satisfies
Eo,o
′
= Uo(w˜)− Uo(w) ≤ 0.060.
Furthermore, there is a game instance where 0.041 ≤ Eo,o′ .
Given that, if one increases the rates of all users by a factor
∆r this yields a utility increase of log(∆r), one can interpret
this result as saying that, by exchanging resources with o′,
slice o may see a gain equivalent to increasing the rate of all
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its users by a factor between 4.1% and 6.1% (given by the
lower and upper bounds of the above theorem). This is quite
low and, moreover, simulation results show that in practical
settings there is actually (almost) never any envy, confirming
that our system is (practically) envy-free.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Next, we evaluate the performance of the SCPA resource
allocation mechanism via simulation. The mobile network
scenario considered is based on the IMT-A evaluation guide-
lines for dense ‘small cell’ deployments [23], which consider
base stations with an intersite distance of 200 meters in a
hexagonal cell layout with 3 sector antennas.5 The network
size |B| is 57 sectors and, unless otherwise stated, users move
according to the Random Waypoint Model (RWP). Users’
Signal Interference to Noise Ratio (SINRu) is computed based
on physical layer network model specified in [23] (which
includes path loss, shadowing, fast fading and antenna gain)
and user association follows the strongest signal policy. The
achievable rate for users, cu, are determined based on the
thresholds reported in [24]. For all our simulation results, we
obtained 95% confidence intervals with relative errors below
1% (not shown in the figures).
A. Overall performance
Throughout the paper we have used static slicing and the
socially optimal resource allocations as our baselines. In order
to confirm our analytical results and gain additional insights,
we have evaluated the performance of the SCPA mechanism
versus these two baselines via simulation. As an intuitive met-
ric for comparison, we have used the extra capacity required
by these baseline schemes to deliver the same performance as
SCPA:
(i) Gain over SS: additional resources required by static
slicing to provide the same utility as SCPA (in %).
5Note that, in this setting, users associate with sectors rather than the base
stations we used in the mechanism description and analysis.
(ii) Loss versus SO: additional resources required by SCPA to
provide the same utility as the socially optimal allocation
(in %); note that this metric is closely related to the Price
of Anarchy analyzed in Section IV-A.
The results shown in Figure 1 are for different user densi-
ties (|U|/|B|) and different slice utilities (αo parameter). As
expected, the SCPA mechanism always has a gain over static
slicing and a loss over the social optimal. However, for αo = 1
the loss is well below the bound given in Section IV-A. We
further observe that performance is particularly good as long
as αo does not exceed 1 (Gain over SS up to 50% and Loss
over SO below 5%), and it degrades mildly as αo increases.
B. Fairness
In addition to overall performance, it is of interest to
evaluate the fairness of the resulting allocations. While in
Section IV-B we derived analytically a bound on the envy,
we have further explored this via simulation by evaluating
up to 107 randomly generated scenarios, with parameters
drawn uniformly in the ranges: |O| ∈ [2, 12], |B| ∈ [10, 90],
|U|/|B| ∈ [3, 15], αo ∈ [0.01, 30] and φ vectors in the simplex.
Our results show that Eo,o
′
< 0 holds for all the cases
explored, confirming that in practice the system is envy-free.
C. Protection against other slices
One of the main objectives of our proposed framework is
to enable slices to customize their resource allocations. This
can be done by adjusting (i) the user priorities φu, and (ii)
the parameter αo, which regulates the desired level of fairness
among the slice’s users. In order to evaluate the impact that
these settings have amongst slices, we simulated a scenario
with three slices: Slice 1 has α1 = 1, Slice 2 has α2 = 4, and
Slice 3 has α3 with varying values. For simplicity, we set the
priorities φu equal for all users.
Figure 2 shows the rate distributions of the 3 slices. We
observe that the choice of α3 is effective in adjusting the level
of user fairness for Slice 3; indeed, as α3 grows, the rate
distribution becomes more homogeneous. Such customization
at Slice 3 has a higher impact on Slice 1 than on Slice 2. This
is the case because, as α2 is quite large, the distribution of
Slice 2’s rates remains homogeneous, making the slice fairly
insensitive to the choices of the other slices. As can be seen in
the subplots, the utilities of Slices 1 and 2 are not only larger
than the utility of static slicing, but remain fairly insensitive
to α3, showing that in both cases we have a good level of
protection between slices.
D. Convergence speed
The existence of a Nash equilibrium and the convergence of
Best Response Dynamics are essential for the system stability.
While the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proved for
all αo > 0, convergence has only been shown for αo ∈ [1, 2].
In order to confirm the convergence of best responses for other
αo values, we have conducted extensive simulations involving
up to 107 randomly generated scenarios in the same parameter
space as in Section V-B. Our results confirmed the convergence
of the best response game in all cases. Moreover, they also
showed that convergence speed mainly depends on αo, while
it is fairly insensitive to the user priorities and the network
size. According to the results, convergence is very quick for
αo ≤ 1 (about 8 rounds) and increases slightly as αo grows
(about 16 rounds for αo = 3). The average number of rounds
needed for the Best Response dynamics to converge are shown
in Figure 3.
E. Impact of user mobility
The above performance results assumes a Random Way-
point model in which, on average, users distributions are
uniform. In order to understand the impact of other users
distributions, we evaluated the Gain over SS for scenarios with
4 slices, equal shares and four different users mobility patterns:
1) Uniform: homogeneous slices with uniform spatial loads.
2) Overlapping hotspots: homogeneous slices with the same
non-uniform spatial loads.
3) Non-overlapping hotspots: heterogenous slices with or-
thogonal non-uniform spatial loads which when aggregate
are more uniform.
4) Mixed: two heterogenous slices with the same non-
uniform spatial loads, two slices with uniform spatial
loads.
Results of our simulations depicted in Figure 4 indicate that
Gains over SS are bigger at scenarios with uneven and com-
plementary traffic loads, since the different slices are capable
to obtain dynamically a resource allocation that better adapts
to the slices traffic distribution. Moreover, we can see that a
higher α reports a smaller gain over Static Slicing, since the
slices tend to be more fair amongst its users and the ability to
exploit statistical multiplexing gets reduced.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed a ‘share-constrained propor-
tional allocation’ framework for network slicing. The frame-
work allows slices to customize the resource allocation to
their users, leading to a network slicing game in which
each slice reacts to the settings of the others. Our main
conclusion is that the framework provides an effective and im-
plementable scheme for dynamically sharing resources across
slices. Indeed, this scheme involves simple operations at base
stations and incurs a limited signaling between the slices
and the infrastructure. Our results confirm system stability
(best response dynamics converge), substantial gains over
static slicing, and fairness of the allocations (envy-freeness).
Moreover, as long as the majority of the slices do not choose
αo values larger than 1 (i.e., they do not all demand very
homogeneous rate distributions), the overall performance is
close to optimal (price of anarchy is very small). Thus, in this
case the flexibility provided by this framework comes at no
cost. If a substantial number of slices choose higher αo’s, then
we pay a (small) price for enabling slice customization.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Given the weight allocation under static slicing, wss, and
the weights of the other slices under dynamic sharing, w−o,
we consider the following weight allocation for slice o:
wu =
wssu∑
u∈Uo
b(u)
wssu
aob(u)(w
−o)∑
b′∈Bo a
o
b′(w−o)
so, (4)
where Bo is the set of base stations where slice o has
customers.
We define ρou(w
ss) as the ratio between the weight of user
u under static slicing and the sum of the weights of all the
users of the same slice in the base station, i.e.,
ρou(w
ss)
.
=
wssu∑
u∈Uo
b(u)
wssu
where we have dropped the terms w−o and wss from
aob(u)(w
−o) and ρou(w
ss) for readability purposes.
With the allocation given by (4), for two users u and u′ of
slice o it holds
wu
wu′
=
ρou
ρou′
aob(u)
aob(u′)
(5)
Furthermore, it also holds that
dob =
∑
u∈Uob
wu =
∑
u∈Uob
ρou
aob(u)∑
b′∈Bo
aob′
so =
aob(u)∑
b′∈Bo
aob′
so =
wu
ρou
for u ∈ Uob .
From the above expression, we have
ρoulb(u)(w)
ρou′ lb(u′)(w)
=
ρou
(
aob(u) + d
o
b(u)
)
ρou′
(
aob(u′) + d
o
b(u′)
) = ρou
(
aob(u) +
wu
ρou
)
ρou′
(
aob(u′) +
wu′
ρo
u′
) ,
and combining this with (5):
ρoulb(u)(w)
ρou′ lb(u′)(w)
=
ρou
(
aob(u) +
aob(u)
ao
b(u′)
wu′
ρo
u′
)
ρou′
(
aob(u′) +
wu′
ρo
u′
)
=
ρoua
o
b(u)
(
1 + wu′ao
b(u′)ρ
o
u′
)
ρou′a
o
b(u′)
(
1 + wu′ao
b(u′)ρ
o
u′
) = ρouaob(u)
ρou′a
o
b(u′)
From the above,
wu =
wu∑
u′∈Uo wu′
so =
so∑
u′∈Uo
wu′
wu
=
=
so∑
u′∈Uo
ρo
u′a
o
b(u′)
ρoua
o
b(u)
=
so∑
u′∈Uo
ρo
u′ lb(u′)(w)
ρoulb(u)(w)
=
ρoulb(u)(w)∑
u′∈Uo ρ
o
u′ lb(u′)(w)
so =
ρoulb(u)(w)∑
b′∈Bo lb′(w)
so
Since Bo ⊆ B: ∑
b∈Bo
lb(w) ≤
∑
b∈B
lb(w) = 1
and thus
wu ≥ ρoulb(u)(w)so,
from which
ru(w) =
wu
lb(u)(w)
cu ≥
ρoulb(u)(w)so
lb(u)(w)
cu = ρ
o
usocu = r
ss
u .
The above holds for all u ∈ U , which proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1
This result follows from Lemma 1. Given the configuration
of the other slices, there exists a configuration for a given slice
under which all its users obtain at least the same throughput
as with static slicing, and thus the slice’s utility with this
configuration is at least as high. As a consequence, in a Nash
equilibrium the slice will receive a utility no smaller than this
value.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let us start for αo 6= 1. The best response of slice o is given
by
wo = arg max
w′o
∑
u∈Uo
φu
1− αo
(
w′ucu
aob(u)(w
′−o) + dob(u)(w
′o)
)1−αo
subject to:
∑
u∈Uo
w′u = s
o, w′u ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ Uo
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is given by
L(w, λ) =
∑
u∈Uo
φu
1− αo
(
wucu
aob(w
−o) + dob(w′
o)
)1−αo
− λo
(∑
u∈Uo
wu − so
)
The partial derivative of the above function with respect to
wu is given by
∂L(w, λ)
∂wu
=
φuc
1−αo
u · (lb(w)− wu)
wαou · lb(w)2−αo
−
∑
u′∈Uo
b(u)
\{u}
φu′c
1−αo
u′ w
1−αo
u′
lb(w)2−αo
− λo
=
φuc
1−αo
u · lb(w)
wαou · lb(w)2−αo −
∑
u′∈Uo
b(u)
φu′c
1−αo
u′ w
1−αo
u′
lb(w)2−αo
− λo
From the above, for two users u, u′ in the same base station
we have
wαou =
φu
φu′
(
cu
cu′
)1−αo
wαou′ (6)
Combining the above two equations yields
∂L(w, λ)
∂wu
=
φu · c1−αou
wαou · lb(w)2−αo ×lb(w)− ∑
u′∈Uo
b(u)
φu′c
1−αo
u′
φuc
1−αo
u
w1−αou′ w
αo
u
− λo
=
φu · c1−αou
wαou · lb(w)2−αo
lb(w)− ∑
u′∈Uo
b(u)
wu′
− λo.
Equaling the above expression for two different users u
and u′ at different base stations, we obtain the following
expression, which holds for any pair of users of slice o (at
the same or different base stations):
wu
wu′
=
βu
βv
(aob(u)(w
−o))
1
αo(
ao
b(u)
(w−o)+do
b(u)
(wo)
) 2
αo
−1
(
ao
b(u′)(w
−o)
) 1
αo(
ao
b(u′)(w
−o)+do
b(u′)(w
o)
) 2
αo
−1
(7)
where βu := (φu)
1
αo (cu)
1
αo
−1. From the above, we obtain
(2) by normalizing. In order to prove that the resulting non-
linear system of equations has a unique solution, we proceed
as follows. Let dob =
∑
u∈Uob wu. From (6),
dob = wu
∑
u′∈Uob
βu′
βu
Combining the above with (7) yields
dob
dob′
=
βu
βv
∑
v′∈Uo
b′
βv′
βv∑
v′∈Uob
βv′
βu
(aob(w
−o))
1
αo
(aob(w−o)+dob)
2
αo
−1
(aob′ (w
−o))
1
αo
(aob′ (w
−o)+do
b′)
2
αo
−1
which is equivalent to
dob
(
aob(w
−o) + dob
) 2
αo
−1
= Kdob′
(
aob′(w
−o) + dob′
) 2
αo
−1
where K is some constant. Then, if we fix dob to some positive
value, there exists a unique positive value of dob′ that satisfies
the above equation. Indeed, the lhs of the equation will be
fixed to some finite value larger than 0, while the rhs grows
from 0 to∞ as we increase dob′ . Moreover, the larger the value
of dob , the larger the resulting d
o
b′ , since both the lhs and the
rhs of the equation are increasing functions of dob and d
o
b′ ,
respectively.
From the above, we can compute the dob′ value of each
base stations as a function of a single dob . Once we have all
dob′ values, we can uniquely compute the user weights wu,
which are an increasing function of dob′ (and thus of d
o
b).
Inserting the resulting weights into
∑
u∈Uo wu(d
o
b) = so, we
have an equation with a single unknown, dob . This equation
has a unique solution, as the lhs is an increasing function of
dob and the rhs is constant. Computing the resulting d
o
b value,
and obtaining from this value the corresponding wu values,
we have a solution to the system. Since all relationships are
bijective, this is the only solution of the system.
The case αo = 1 is proven employing a similar argument.
Indeed, by repeating the same steps as above for for Uo(w) =∑
u∈Uo φu log ru(w), it is easy to verify the best response
for this case corresponds to the expression given by (2) for
αo = 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
We start by proving the following lemma which is required
for the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4. Let Ro be the implicit function that denotes the
best response of slice o, i.e., wo = Ro(wo,w−o). Ro is a
continuous and differentiable function for aob 6= 0 ∀b.
Proof. We start by noting that Ro is a continuous and dif-
ferentiable function of ao = (aob : b ∈ Bo) when wo is
fixed. So it follows from the implicit function theorem that the
best response is continuous and differentiable in ao. As ao is
continuous function of w−o, it follows that the best response
is a continuous and differentiable function of the other slices’
weights.
Now, let us define a perturbed game G(ε) for some ε > 0, in
which there is an additional slice which places a weight of ε
in each base station.6 The existence of a NE for this perturbed
game is guaranteed by the result of [21] since (i) the utility is a
concave function, (ii) it is continuous (as given by the previous
lemma),7 and (iii) the game strategy space set of a slice, given
by So = {wo ∈ Ro | wo ≥ 0 and ∑u∈Uo wu = so}, is
compact and convex.8 Moreover, the following lemma shows
that the weights in the NE must be greater than or equal to a
value δ for any ε < εmax.9
Lemma 5. For any NE weight allocation of game G(ε), there
exists a constant δ > 0 such that wεu ≥ δ ∀u ∈ U and ε <
εmax.
6In the perturbed game, the shares are rescaled so that they still sum 1, i.e.,∑
o∈O so + |B|ε = 1.
7Note that in the perturbed game aob ≥ ε > 0.
8The statement of the theorem of [21] requires that Uo(w) is defined in
the strategy space So, which is not satisfied for αo = 1 since in this case
Uo(w)→ −∞ when wu = 0 for some u ∈ Uo. However, the proof of this
theorem only requires that the mapping wo = Ro(w−o) is defined in So,
which is satisfied for αo = 1 (and indeed this mapping never yields wu = 0,
as this would not maximize the slice’s utility).
9Note that, as the sum of the weights of all players in the game is 1, i.e.,∑
o∈O so + |B|ε = 1, we have the following upper bound for ε: ε ≤ εˆ =
1/|B|.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, the best response of a user
u ∈ Uo in the ε perturbed game is given by
wu =
(ε+aob(u))
1
αo
(ε+ao
b(u)
+do
b(u)
)
2
αo
−1
∑
v∈Uo
(
βv
βu
)
(ε+ao
b(v)
)
1
αo
(ε+ao
b(v)
+do
b(v)
)
2
αo
−1
so. (8)
In order to derive a bound for wu, we proceed along the
following steps. First, we obtain a bound for wu as a function
of lb. Second, we derive a bound for lb. Finally, by combining
the results of the first and the second steps, we obtain a bound
for wu.
Bound for wu as a function of lb
We will first prove the existence of a bound for the case of
αo ≥ 1 and then for the case αo < 1. Let us start with the
case αo ≥ 1. From (2) it follows
wu ≥
(ε+aob(u))
1
αo
(ε+ao
b(u)
+do
b(u)
)
2
αo
−1
max
v∈Uo
[
βv
βu
] ∑
v∈Uo
(ε+ao
b(v)
)
1
αo
(ε+ao
b(v)
+do
b(v)
)
2
αo
−1
so
Let us define the constant mou = max
v∈Uo
[
βv
βu
]
. Then,
wu ≥
(ε+lb(u)−dob(u))
1
αo
(ε+lb(u))
2
αo
−1
mou
∑
v∈Uo
(ε+lb(v)−dob(v))
1
αo
(ε+lb(v))
2
αo
−1
so
≥
(lb(u)−dob(u))
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
mou
∑
v∈Uo
(ε+ lb(v))
− 1αo+1
so
≥
(lb(u)−dob(u))
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
mou
∑
v∈Uo
(
(ε)−
1
αo
+1 + (lb(v))
− 1αo+1
)so
≥
(lb(u)−dob(u))
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
mou
∑
v∈Uo
(
1 + (ε)−
1
αo
+1
)so
≥ so
2mou|Uo|
(lb(u) − dob(u))
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
We next focus on the case αo < 1. From (2), it follows that
(wu)
αo
(wv)αo
=
(ε+lb(u)−dob(u))
(ε+lb(u))2−αo
(ε+lb(v)−dob(v))
(ε+lb(v))2−αo
≥
(lb(u)−dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
(ε+lb(v)−dob(v))
(ε+lb(v))2−αo
From the above,
(wu)
αo ≥
(lb(u) − dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
(ε+ lb(v))
2−αo
(ε+ lb(v) − dob(v))
(wv)
αo
≥
(lb(u) − dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
(ε+ lb(v))
1−αo(wv)αo
≥
(lb(u) − dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
wv
(
wv
lb(u)
)1−αo
≥
(lb(u) − dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
wv
Given that the sum of the weights of all the users of slice o
is equal to so, there needs to be at least one user v for which∑
u′∈Uo
b(v)
wu′ = dvwv ≥ so|Uo| . If we take such a user v, from
the above we obtain
(wu)
αo ≥
(lb(u) − dob(u))
(lb(u))2−αo
so
|Uo| , ∀u ∈ Uo
Isolating wu from the above yields
wu ≥
(
so
|Uo|mou
) 1
αo (lb(u) − dob(u))
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
≥ so
2mou|Uo|
(lb(u) − duwu)
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1
Putting together the bounds obtained for αo ≥ 1 and αo < 1
leads to the following expression which holds for any αo > 0:
wu ≥ so
2mou|Uo|
(lb(u) − duwu)
1
αo
(lb(u))
2
αo
−1 , for αo > 0 (9)
Bound for lb
We will now provide a bound for lb. Let us define U∗b as a
subset of U that contains a representative user of each slice at
base station b. Let us further define sets U (∗,≥1)b and U (∗,<1)b
as the subsets of U∗b corresponding to the slices with αo ≥ 1
and αo < 1, respectively. Note that
lb(u) =
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu =
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu +
∑
u∈U(∗,<1)
b(u)
duwu.
Let us denote the largest αo of the slices with αo ≥ 1 by αo
and and the smallest αo of these slices by αo. Similarly, let
α′o denote the largest αo of the slices with αo < 1 and α
′
o the
smallest. Let us further define η = min
o∈O,u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
sodu
2mou|U| .
Then, using the bound for wu in (9), we obtain∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu ≥ η
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
(lb(u) − duwu)
1
αo(u)
(lb(u))
2
αo(u)
−1
≥ η(lb(u))1−
1
αo
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
(1− duwu
lb(u)
)
1
αo
≥ η(lb(u))1−
1
αo
 ∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
1−
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu
lb(u)

1
αo
≥ η(lb(u))1−
1
αo
 ∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
1−
∑
u∈U∗
b(u)
duwu
lb(u)

1
αo
≥ η(
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu)
1− 1αo
[
(|U (∗,≥1)b(u) | − 1)
] 1
αo
where the third inequality holds from concavity.
Isolating
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu from the above yields∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu ≥ (η)αo(|U (∗,≥1)b(u) | − 1)
αo
αo (10)
Applying the same reasoning to set U (∗,<1)b(u) , we obtain∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu ≥ (η)α′o(|U (∗,≤1)b(u) | − 1)
α′o
α′o (11)
Putting together (10) and (11) yields
lb(u) =
∑
u∈U(∗,≥1)
b(u)
duwu +
∑
u∈U(∗,<1)
b(u)
duwu
≥ (η)αo(|U (∗,≥1)b(u) | − 1)
αo
αo + (η)α
′
o(|U (∗,≤1)b(u) | − 1)
α′o
α′o
The above gives a lower bound for lb as long there are at
least two slices with αo ≥ 1 or αo < 1 in base station b.
We next deal with the case in which there are two slices in
base station b, o and o′, one with αo < 1 and the other with
αo′ ≥ 1. It follows from the previous analysis that for this
case we have
wu ≥ so
2mou|Uo|
(dvwv)
1
αo
(lb)
2
αo
−1 (12)
and
wv ≥ so
′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
(duwu)
1
α
o′
(lb)
2
α
o′
−1 (13)
Combining (12) and (13) we obtain
wαou ≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo dv
(lb)2−αo
so′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
(duwu)
1
α
o′
(lb)
2
α
o′
−1
from which
l
1−αo+2/αo′
b (wu)
αo− 1α
o′ ≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo dv(du) 1αo′ so′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
and thus
l
1+1/αo′
b
(
wu
lb
)αo−1/αo′
≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo dv(du) 1αo′ so′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
Multiplying each side by dαo−1/αo′u we obtain
l
1+1/αo′
b
(
duwu
lb
)αo−1/αo′
≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo dv(du)αoso′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
from which
lb
(
dob(u)
lb
)αo−1/αo′
≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo dv(du)αoso′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
.
= µ1
(14)
By following the same reasoning as above but isolating wv
instead of wu from (12) and (13), we obtain
lb
(
dob(v)
lb
)αo′−1/αo
≥
(
so′
2mo′v |Uo′ |
)αo′ sodu(dv)αo
2mou|Uo|
.
= µ2
(15)
If αo − 1/αo′ > 0, it holds
(
dob(u)
lb
)αo−1/αo′ ≤ 1, and then
from (14) we obtain
lb ≥
(
so
2mou|Uo|
)αo so′dv(du)αo
2mo′v |Uo′ |
Otherwise (i.e., in the case αo − 1/αo′ < 0), by taking
the minimum of both sides of (14) and (15), we obtain the
following inequality
lb min
(dob(u)
lb
)αo− 1α
o′
,
(
dob(v)
lb
)αo′− 1αo ≥ min (µ1, µ2)
From the above,
lb min
 1(
do
b(u)
lb
)αˆo , 1(do
b(v)
lb
)αˆo
 ≥ min (µ1, µ2)
where αˆo = max(−αo + 1αo′ ,−αo′ +
1
αo)
. The above is
equivalent to
lb
1(
max
(
do
b(u)
lb
,
do
b(v)
lb
))αˆo ≥ min (µ1, µ2)
Noting that either
dob(u)
lb
≥ 12 or
dob(v)
lb
≥ 12 ,
lb ≥
(
1
2
)αˆo
min (µ1, µ2)
.
= lb > 0
The above proves that lb is bounded in the perturbed game.
Hereafter, we denote this bound by lb > 0.
Bound for wu
Let us start with the case αo ≥ 1. Combining (9) with the
bound for lb gives
wu ≥ so
2mou|Uo|(lb)
2
αo
−1 (lb − duwu)
1
αo
≥ so
2mou|Uo|(lb)
2
αo
−1
[
(lb)
1
αo − (duwu) 1αo
]
Since w
1
αo
u ≥ wu, it follows that
w
1
αo
u +
so(duwu)
1
αo
mou|Uo|(lb)
2
αo
−1 ≥
so(lb)
1
αo
mou|Uo|(lb)
2
αo
−1
from which
wu ≥
 so(lb(u)) 1αo
mou|Uo|(lb(u))
2
αo
−1 + so(du)
1
αo
αo
which provides a lower bound on wu for this case. We next
look at the case αo < 1. Combining again (9) with the bound
for lb gives
(wu)
αo ≥
(
so
2|Uo|mou
)
(lb − duwu)
which yields
(wu)
αo + (wu)
αo
sodu
2|Uo|mou
≥ (wu)αo + wu sodu
2|Uo|mou
≥ solb(u)|Uo|mou
≥ solb
2|Uo|mou
Isolating wu from the above equation, we obtain the fol-
lowing lower bound for this case:
wu ≥
(
solb
(2|Uo|mou + sodu)
) 1
αo .
= δ
With the above, we have obtained a lower bound on wu for
all possible cases. Hereafter we denote this lower bound by
δ.
Building on the result of the above lemma, we proceed as
follows. Let us consider a decreasing sequence εk → 0, where
ε0 ≤ εmax, and let w(εk) denote the Nash Equilibrium of
game G(ε
k). Since the strategy space S = S1× ...×S |O| is a
compact set, there exists a subsequence εkn such that εkn → 0
and w(ε
kn ) → w(0). Note that w(εkn )u ≥ δ ∀u and therefore
w
(0)
u ≥ δ ∀u. Now, let us define function
g(ε,w) = R(ε)(w)−w
where R(ε)(w) is the best response to w in the game G(ε).
Note that g(ε,w) is equal to zero at the NE of the perturbed
game G(ε
k). Furthermore, from the above lemma we have that
at this NE it holds wu > 0 ∀u (even as ε → 0), and from
Lemma 4 we further have that this function is continuous and
differentiable for wu > 0 ∀u. Thus, g(εkn ,w(εkn )) = 0 and
lim
εkn→0
g(εkn ,w(ε
kn )) = g(0,w(0)) = 0
implying that indeed w(0) exists and is a Nash Equilibrium of
our (non perturbed) game.
Proof of Lemma 3
We consider the following two cases: (i) ∆ω(r + 1) = 0
and (ii) ∆ω(r + 1) 6= 0.
Case 1: ∆ω(r + 1) = 0.
From ∆ω(r+ 1) = 0, we have that the lhs of (3) is equal
to 1. Furthermore, from ∆ω(r) 6= 0 it follows that the rhs
must be strictly greater than 1. The inequality for this case
follows from these two results.
Case 2: ∆ω(r + 1) 6= 0.
Let us define ∆ao(t) = (∆aob(t) : b ∈ B) such that
aob(t) = a
o
b(t− |O|+ 1)(1 + ∆aob(t)).
Note that, if operator o updates its best response at time t,
then aob(t) is the congestion that operator o sees upon making
its update, and ∆aob(t) corresponds to the congestion variation
relative to its previous update slot.
In order to prove (3), we will begin by showing that for any
slice o updating its weights in round r+ 1, say at time t+ 1,
the following holds:
max
(
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1),
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
)
(16)
< max
t′∈{t−|O|+1,...,t}
(
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′),
1
1 + ∆wo(t′)(t′)
)
where o(t′) denotes the slice updating its weights at time t′.
The above means that the “relative change” in weights for
slice o is strictly smaller than that seen by the other slices in
the previous |O| updates.
To prove (16), we will consider two additional subcases: (i)
∆ao(t) = 0, and (i) ∆ao(t) 6= 0.
Subcase 2.1: ∆ao(t) = 0.
To prove (16) for this case, we will show that the lhs of (16)
is equal to 1 and the rhs is strictly greater than 1. To show
that the lhs is equal to 1, we proceed as follows. Note that, as
∆ao(t) = 0, the congestion seen by slice o at time t + 1 is
unchanged with respect to its previous update, and therefore
∆wo(t+ 1) = 0. As a result of this, the lhs of (16) is equal
to 1.
The proof that the rhs of (16) is strictly greater than 1
follows by contradiction. Suppose that the rhs is equal to 1.
This implies that ∆wo(t
′)(t′) = 0 for t′ ∈ {t−|O|+1, ..., t},
where o(t′) denotes the slice that changes its weights at time t′.
This yields ∆ao(t+2)(t+1) = 0, since there have not been any
changes in the weights since its last update, which in turn leads
to ∆wo(t+2)(t+ 2) = 0. Applying this argument recursively,
it can be shown that ∆wo(t
′)(t′) = 0 for any t′′ > t+ 1. This
in turn implies that there is now weight change in round r+1,
i.e., ∆ω(r + 1) = 0, which contradicts the fact that we are
looking at case ∆ω(r + 1) 6= 0.
Subcase 2.2: ∆ao(t) 6= 0.
In order to show (16) for this case, we will start by proving
the following intermediate result
max
(
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1),
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
)
<
max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
,
(17)
where ∆ao(t) = max
b∈B
∆ao(t) and ∆ao(t) = min
b∈B
∆ao(t).10
10Note that we are defining ∆ao(t) and ∆ao(t) across all base stations,
and not only those where slice o has users; for the base stations where slice
o does not have users, ao(t) will simply be the load of the base station.
If ∆wo(t+ 1) = 0, (17) follows from the fact that the lhs
of (17) is equal to 1 and the rhs is strictly greater than 1 (given
that ∆ao(t) 6= 0).
We next consider the case where ∆wo(t+ 1) 6= 0. For this
case, we prove (17) by showing that the each of two terms of
the lhs of (17) is strictly lower than the rhs. First, we show
this for the first term, i.e.,
(
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
)
< max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
.
(18)
We prove (18) by contradiction: we suppose that
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1) ≥ max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
. (19)
and show that this yields a contradiction.
Let u, v ∈ Uo be, respectively, the user for which ∆wu(t+
1) takes the largest value and the one for which it takes the
smallest value. Then,
wu(t+ 1)
wv(t+ 1)
=
wu(t)(1 + ∆w
o(t+ 1))
wv(t)(1 + ∆wo(t+ 1))
(20)
where ∆wo(t+1) = ∆wu(t+1) and ∆wo(t+1) = ∆wv(t+1)
For readability purposes, let us denote the base station of
user u by b and the base station of user v by b′. From (2), we
have
wu(t+ 1)
wv(t+ 1)
=
βu(a
o
b(t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob(t)))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob(t)))+duwu(t)(1+∆wu(t+1))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob′ (t)))
1
αo
(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob′ (t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wv(t+1))
2
αo
−1
=
βu(a
o
b(t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob(t)))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob(t))+duwu(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob′ (t)))
1
αo
(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆aob′ (t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
By taking the largest and smallest values in ∆ao(t), we
obtain the following inequality:
wu(t+ 1)
wv(t+ 1)
≤ βu
βv
(aob(t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t))+duwu(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
=
βu
βv
×
(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αoao
b
(t−|O|+1) (1+∆ao(t))
(1+∆ao(t))
1
2−αo
+duwu(t)
(1+∆wo(t+1))
(1+∆ao(t))
1
2−αo
 2αo −1
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
From our assumption, we have that 1 + ∆wo(t + 1) ≥
1 + ∆ao(t), from which it follows that:
wu(t+ 1)
wv(t+ 1)
≤
βu(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)+duwu(t))
2
αo
−1
 (1+∆ao(t))
(1+∆ao(t))
1
2−αo
 2αo −1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
≤
βu(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αo (1+∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)+duwu(t))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t))+dvwv(t)(1+∆wo(t+1)))
2
αo
−1
<
βu(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αo (1+∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)+duwu(t))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1)(1+∆ao(t)))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)+dvwv(t))
2
αo
−1
=
βu(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)+duwu(t))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)+dvwv(t))
2
αo
−1
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
=
wu(t)
wv(t)
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
.
where the third step holds since ∆ao(t) < 0 and ∆wo(t +
1) < 0, and the last one follows from the fact that wu(t) =
wu(t − |O| + 1) (as slice o does not updated its weights in
the time interval {t−|O|+2, ..., t}). Combining (20) with the
above yields
wu(t)(1 + ∆w
o(t+ 1))
wv(t)(1 + ∆wo(t+ 1))
<
wu(t)
wv(t)
(1 + ∆ao(t))1−
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
.
From the fact that xayb ≤ max(x, y) for x, y ≥ 1 and
a+ b = 1 we have
(1 + ∆ao(t+ 1))1−
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
≤ max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
.
From the above two equations we have
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
< max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
.
and combining this with (19) yields
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
< 1
which contradicts 11+∆wo(t+1) > 1, thus proving (18).
The next step to prove (17) is to show that the second term
of the lhs of (17) is strictly lower than the rhs, i.e.,
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
< max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
. (21)
The proof is analogous to the one for (18) and proceeds
again by contradiction: we suppose that
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
≥ max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
, (22)
and show that this yields a contradiction.
Employing a similar argument to the one above, we have:
wu(t+ 1)
wv(t+ 1)
<
βu(aob(t−|O|+1))
1
αo
(aob(t−|O|+1)+duwu(t))
2
αo
−1
βv(aob′ (t−|O|+1))
1
αo
(ao
b′ (t−|O|+1)+dvwv(t))
2
αo
−1
(1 + ∆ao(t+ 1))
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
=
wu(t)
wv(t)
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1− 1
αo
.
Combining (20) with the above yields
wu(t)(1 + ∆w
o(t+ 1))
wv(t)(1 + ∆wo(t+ 1))
<
wu(t)
wv(t)
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))1−
1
αo
.
Again from xayb ≤ max(x, y) for x, y ≥ 1 and a+ b = 1
we have
(1 + ∆ao(t))
1
αo
(1 + ∆ao(t))1−
1
αo
≤ max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
.
From the above two equations
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
< max
(
1 + ∆ao(t),
1
1 + ∆ao(t)
)
.
Combining the above with (22) leads to (1+∆wo(t+1)) >
1, which contradicts the fact that ∆wo(t + 1) is necessarily
strictly greater than 1.
The above proves our intermediate step (17). Next, building
on this intermediate result, we shall show that (16) holds.
Recall that o(t′) denotes the slice that updates its weights
at time slot t′. We have that
aob(t) =
∑
u∈Ub\Uob
wu(t) =
∑
u∈Ub\Uob
wu(t(u))
=
∑
u∈Ub\Uob
wu(t(u)− 1)(1 + ∆wu(t(u)))
where t(u) represents the time when user u updates its weights
within the interval {t− |O|+ 2, ..., t}.
If we take the maximum ∆wu(t(u)) over all users, we
obtain the following inequality
aob(t) ≤ max
u∈Ub\Uob
(1 + ∆wu(t(u)))
∑
u∈Ub\Uob
wu(t(u)− 1)
= max
u∈Ub\Uob
(1 + ∆wu(t(u)))a
o
b(t− |O|+ 1).
where the second inequality follows from the fact that we are
taking the weight values prior to their update.
Given that aob(t) = a
o
b(t− |O|+ 1)(1 + ∆aob(t)), the above
leads to
1 + ∆aob(t) ≤ max
u∈Ub\Uob
(1 + ∆wu(t(u)))
From the definition of ∆wo(t) we have that ∆wo(t) ≥
∆wu(t) for u ∈ Uo, from which
1 + ∆aob(t) ≤ max
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t}
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′)
Since the above inequality holds for all b ∈ B, it also holds
if we take the maximum value over all b in the rhs, which
leads to
1 + ∆ao(t) ≤ max
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t}
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′).
Similarly, it can be shown that
1 + ∆ao(t) ≥ min
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t}
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′).
Combining the above with (17) yields
max
(
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1),
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
)
< max
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t}
(
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′),
1
1 + ∆wo(t′)(t′)
)
If we add the term t− |O|+ 1 in the max operation of the
rhs, the inequality still holds, thus
max
(
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1),
1
1 + ∆wo(t+ 1)
)
< max
t′∈{t−|O|+1,...,t}
(
1 + ∆wo(t
′)(t′),
1
1 + ∆wo(t′)(t′)
)
With the above we have proven (16). In the next (and last)
step of the proof, we now show (3) building on this result. For
conciseness, we define:
f(t) = max
(
1 + ∆wo(t)(t),
1
1 + ∆wo(t)(t)
)
. (23)
With the above definition, (16) can be rewritten as
f(t+ 1) < max
t′∈{t−|O|+1,...,t}
f(t′). (24)
Applying the same argument to the update at time slot t+2
yields
f(t+ 2) < max
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t+1}
f(t′),
= max
[
max
t′∈{t−|O|+2,...,t}
f(t′), f(t+ 1)
]
and combining the above with (24) we obtain
f(t+ 2) < max
t′∈{t−|O|+1,...,t}
f(t′).
If we now apply the above argument recursively for t +
3, t+ 4, t+ 5, . . ., we obtain
f(t+ i) ≤ max
t′∈{t−|O|+1,...,t}
f(t′), i < 1. (25)
Without loss of generality, let assume that t + 1 coincides
with the start of a round; then from the above it follows that
max
i∈{1,...,|O|}
f(t+ i) < max
j∈{1,...,|O|}
f(t− |O|+ j) (26)
where the max on the lhs includes the updates corresponding
to round r+ 1, while those on the rhs correspond to round r.
Finally, expressing the above equation in terms of ∆ωou(r)
leads to (3).
Proof of Theorem 3
The slices responses at the end of each round are captured
by the sequence ω(r) for r = 1, 2, ... and the dynamics are
given by ω(r+ 1) = R(ω(r)), where R(ω(r)) is the result
of applying sequentially the best response for each of the
slices. Note that ω(r) is in the set S = S1 ×S2 × ...×S |O|
where:
So = {ωo ∈ Ro | ωo ≥ 0 and
∑
b∈B
nobω
o
b = s
o}.
Let us define a function:
V (ω(r)) := max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1)
)
− 1
Notice that V (ω(r)) is a function of the relative weight
changes at round r + 1 given the weights at round r, ω(r).
Note that, unless algorithm converged (i.e., ω(r + 1) =
ω(r) and V (ω(r)) = 0), there should at least one slice with
a user u for which ∆ωou(r + 1) > 0 and a user v for which
∆ωov(r+1) < 0. Thus, in this case it must be that V (ω(r)) >
0 and
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1)
)
> 1
Note also that by Lemma 3 it follows that if ω(r + 1) 6=
ω(r), then
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r + 1)
)
<
max
o∈O
(
1 + ∆ωo(r),
1
1 + ∆ωo(r)
)
,
(27)
which is equivalent to V (ω(r + 1)))) < V (ω(r)).
Note that, since ∆ωo > −1, V (ω(r)) is continuous.
Furthermore, the best response functions governing ∆ are also
continuous, as shown in Theorem 2.
In summary, the above results show that V (ω(r)) is
continuous, non-negative and decreasing each round. So, we
might expect it to converge to 0 in which case the slices
weights must have converged. We show this by contradiction.
Suppose V (ω(r)) converges instead to  > 0, so V (ω(0)) ≥
V (ω(r)) ≥  for all r. Let us define V = {ω|V (ω(0)) ≥
V (ω) ≥ } and let C = {ω|ω ∈ S ∩ V}. From this, V is
closed, and since S is compact, so is C. From the continuity
of V we have that:
δ = max
ω∈C
V (R(ω)))− V (ω) < 0
Clearly it is not possible V (ω(r)) ≥  since each round
it decreases by at least δ. It follows that the weights must
converge when V (ω(r)) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof follows from the following three lemmas.
Lemma 6. An optimal (not necessarily unique) solution to the
centralized problem is given by w∗ which assigns weights to
all users of a given slice proportionally to their priorities, i.e.,
w∗u = φuso, ∀u ∈ Uo.
Proof. We need only show that U(w∗) ≥ U(w) for any other
feasible weight vector w . To that end, consider
U(w∗)− U(w) =
∑
o∈O
∑
u∈Uo
φu
(
log
(
w∗ucu
lb(w∗)
)
− log
(
wucu
lb(w)
))
Let us denote the distributions induced by w∗ and w
respectively as: pb(w) = (pbu(w) =
wu
lb(w)
: u ∈ Ub) and
pb(w∗) = (pbu(w
∗) = wulb(w∗) : u ∈ Ub). Since φ = w∗, we
have
U(w∗)− U(w) =
∑
b∈B
lb(w
∗)
∑
o∈O
∑
u∈Ubo
pbu(w
∗) log
(
pbu(w
∗)
pbu(w)
)
=
∑
b∈B
lb(w
∗)D(pb(w∗)||pb(w))
where D(pb(w∗)||pb(w)) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
between the distributions induced by w∗ and w respec-
tively, i.e., pb(w∗) and pb(w). It is known [25] that
D(pb(w∗)||pb(w)) ≥ 0 and 0 only when pb(w) = pb(w∗)
Hence it follows that w∗ is optimal.
Lemma 7. Let w be a Nash Equilibrium of the distributed
resource allocation game, and w∗ an optimal solution. Then,
U(w∗)− U(w) ≤ log(e).
Proof. Since in the Nash Equilibrium each slice maximizes
its utility given the allocation of the other slices,∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
wu
lb(u)(w)
)
≥
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
w∗u
dob(u)(w
∗) + aob(u)(w)
)
Given that dob(u)(w
∗) + aob(u)(w) ≤ lb(u)(w) + lb(u)(w∗),∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
wu
lb(u)(w)
)
≥
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
w∗u
lb(u)(w) + lb(u)(w∗)
)
From the above it follows that∑
u∈Uo
φu log(ru(w
∗))−
∑
u∈Uo
φu log(ru(w))
≤
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
w∗ucu
lb(u)(w
∗)
)
−
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
w∗ucu
lb(u)(w) + lb(u)(w
∗)
)
= −
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
lb(u)(w
∗)
lb(u)(w) + lb(u)(w
∗)
)
Summing the above over all slices weighted by the corre-
sponding shares yields
U(w∗)− U(w) ≤ −
∑
u∈U
φuso log
(
lb(u)(w
∗)
lb(u)(w) + lb(u)(w∗)
)
Given w∗u = φuso, we have
U(w∗)− U(w) ≤ −
∑
b∈B
log
(
lb(w
∗)
lb(w) + lb(w∗)
)∑
u∈Ub w
∗
u
= −
∑
b∈B
∑
u∈Ub
wu log
(
lb(w
∗)
lb(w) + lb(w∗)
)∑v∈Ub w∗v∑
v∈Ub wv
= −
∑
b∈B
∑
u∈Ub
wu log
(
lb(w
∗)/lb(w)
1 + lb(w∗)/lb(w)
) lb(w∗)
lb(w)
and, given that (x/(1 + x))x > 1/e for x ≥ 0, this yields
U(w∗)− U(w) ≤
∑
b∈B
∑
u∈Ub
wu log(e) = log(e).
Lemma 8. There exists some scenario for which U(w∗) −
U(w) = log(e).
Proof. Let us consider a scenario with two slices with shares
s1 and s2, respectively. There are two base stations. Slice 1 has
m+1 users, m associated to base station 1 and one associated
to base station 2. Slice 2 has one user associated to base station
2. All users have cub = 1. Under the optimal allocation:
U(w∗) =
s1
m+ 1
m log
(
1
m
)
+
s1
m+ 1
log
(
s1
m+1
s1
(m+1) + s2
)
+ s2 log
(
s2
s1
(m+1) + s2
)
,
and under the Nash equilibrium
U(w) =
s1
m+ 1
m log
(
1
m
)
+
s1
m+ 1
log
(
s1
s1 + s2
)
+ s2 log
(
s2
s1 + s2
)
.
For m→∞ this yields U(w∗) = s1 log
(
1
m
)
+ s2 log(1) and
U(w) = s1 log
(
1
m
)
+ s2 log
(
s2
s1+s2
)
. From this,
U(w)− U(w∗) = s2 log
(
s2
s1 + s2
)
which tends to − log(e) when s1 → 1 and s2 → 0.
Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 9. Let us consider two slices, o and o′, that have
the same share so. Let the utility function of slice o be Uo =∑
u∈Uo φu log(ru). Then it holds
Uo(w˜o)− Uo(wo) ≤ 0.060
Proof. In order to bound the envy Uo(w˜) − Uo(w) at the
NE, we will construct a weight allocation m that satisfies
Uo(m) ≤ Uo(w) and Uo(m˜) ≥ Uo(w˜) – where w˜ and m˜
are the allocations resulting from exchanging the resources of
slices o and o′ in w and m, respectively. It then follows that
Uo(m˜)− Uo(m) is an upper bound on the envy.
Specifically, the weight allocation m will be chosen such
that: (i) for all slices different from o, the weights remain the
same as in the NE, i.e, m−o = w−o; and (ii) the weights
of slice o are chosen so as to maximize Uo(m) subject to
dob(m
o) =
∑
u∈Uob mu ≤ a
o
b(m
−o) ∀b ∈ B and slice o’s
share constraint. Note that with this weight allocation we have
aob(u)(m
−o) = aob(u)(w
−o) – for readability purposes, we will
use just aob(u). Note also that the weights that slice o would
have with the resources of o′ remain the same, i.e. m˜o = w˜o.
By following a similar argument to that of Lemma 2, it
can be seen that the above leads to the weights mu for u ∈
Uo solving the set of equations below, which have a feasible
solution as long as so <
∑
u∈Uo a
o
b(u)(m
−o) (we deal with
the case
∑
b∈Bo a
o
b < so later).
mu =

aob(u)
φu∑
v∈Uo
b(u)
φv
, aob(u) = d
o
b(u)(m
o)
φu
aob(u)
ao
b(u)
+do
b(u)
(mo)∑
v∈Uˆo
φv
ao
b(v)
ao
b(v)
+do
b(v)
(mo)
s′o, a
o
b(u) > d
o
b(u)(m
o)
where Uˆo is the set of users of slice o for which aob(u) >
dob(u)(m
o) and s′o = so −
∑
u∈Uo\Uˆo mu.
It is clear that with this weight allocation we have Uo(m) ≤
Uo(w). Indeed, only the weights of slice o have changed and
(as mentioned before) wo is the best response of the slice o,
hence any other weight setting for this slice will provide a
lower utility.
To show Uo(m˜) ≥ Uo(w˜) we proceed as follows. The base
stations that initially had a load for operator o larger than aob
(dob(u)(m
o) > aob) decrease their load with the new allocation,
while the others increase it. Let us denote the first set of base
stations as B1 and the other set as B2. Since the base stations
of set B1 decrease their load in the new allocation and the
base stations of set B2 increase it, we can move from the
initial allocation to the new one by iteratively selecting one
base station of set B1 and one of set B2 and moving load
from the first one to the second until one of them reaches its
target load. When decreasing the load of base station b and
increasing that of base station b′ by δ we have
dUo(w˜)
dδ
= −
∑
u∈Uo
b′
φu
lb′(w˜)
+
∑
u∈Uob
φu
lb(w˜)
If we can show at the beginning (before increasing/decreasing
the load of any base station), for any b ∈ B1 and b′ ∈ B2 it
holds ∑
u∈Uob
φu
lb(w˜)
≥
∑
u∈Uo
b′
φu
lb′(w˜)
(28)
we will have the value of
∑
u∈Uob
φu
lb
for any base station of
set B1 will always be larger than for any base station of set
B2, since it are larger at the beginning and it increases in the
intermediate steps, while it decreases for a base station of B2.
With this, dUo(m˜)/dδ is positive at the beginning and will
continue to be positive in the intermediate steps, yielding to
an increase in dUo(m˜).
To show (28), we proceed as follows. It holds that
dob(m
o)
dob′
=
∑
u∈Uob φu∑
u′∈Uo
b′
φu′
1
1+dob(m
o)/aob
1
1+do
b′ (m
o)/ao
b′
=∑
u∈Uob φu∑
u′∈Uo
b′
φu′
1 + dob′ (mo)aob′
1 +
dob(m
o)
aob

For b ∈ B1 and b′ ∈ B2 (since aob < dob(mo) and aob′ >
dob′(m
o))
dob(m
o)
dob′(m
o)
<
∑
u∈Uob φu∑
u′∈Uo
b′
φu′
and thus
lb∑
u∈Uob φu
=
aob + d
o
b(m
o)∑
u∈Uob φu
<
2dob(m
o)∑
u∈Uob φu
<
2dob′(m
o)∑
u∈Uo
b′
φu
≤ a
o
b′ + d
o
b′(m
o)∑
u∈Uo
b′
φu
=
lb′∑
u∈Uo
b′
φu
which proves (28), and thus Uo(m˜) ≥ Uo(w˜).
We now go back to the case
∑
b∈Bo a
o
b < so. Following the
above procedure, in this case we can find an allocation mo that
satisfies: (i) Uo(m) ≤ Uo(w), (ii) Uo(m˜) ≥ Uo(w˜) and (iii)
dob(m
o) ≥ aob ∀b. In this case we then have Uo(w˜)−Uo(w) ≤
Uo(m˜)− Uo(m) ≤ 0.
To find an upper bound on Uo(m˜)− Uo(m), recall that
Uo(m˜) =
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
m˜ucu
lb(m˜)
)
,
and
Uo(m) =
∑
u∈Uo
φu log
(
mucu
lb(m)
)
.
Given that lb(m˜) = lb(m) and m˜u = mu for u /∈ Uˆo, this
yields
Uo(m˜)− Uo(m) =
∑
u∈Uˆo
φu log(m˜u)−
∑
u∈Uˆo
φu log(mu).
Since
∑
u∈Uˆo log(m˜u) subject to
∑
u∈Uˆo m˜u = s
′
o takes a
maximum at m˜u = φˆus′o (where φˆu = φu/
∑
v∈Uˆo φv),
Uo(m˜)− Uo(m) ≤
∑
u∈Uˆo
φu log(φˆus
′
o)−
∑
u∈Uˆo
φu log(mu)
≤
∑
u∈Uˆo
φˆu log(φˆus
′
o)−
∑
u∈Uˆo
φˆu log(mu) (29)
In order to bound the term
∑
u∈Uˆo φˆu log(mu) above, we
look for a bound on mumv . Given that a
o
b ≥ dob(mo) holds for
all b, we have for u, v ∈ Uˆo:
mu
mv
=
φu
φv
aob(u)
ao
b(u)
+do
b(u)
(mo)
ao
b(v)
ao
b(v)
+do
b(v)
(mo)
>
φu
φv
aob(u)
ao
b(u)
+ao
b(u)
ao
b(v)
ao
b(v)
=
1
2
φˆu
φˆv
.
It can be seen that
∑
u∈Uˆo φˆu log(mu) subject to
mu
mv
≥
1
2
φˆu
φˆv
and
∑
u∈Uˆo φˆu = 1 is maximized when the
mu
φˆu
of
all users but one is equal to the lower bound given by the
constraint, which yields
mu
φˆu
=
1
2
mv
φˆv
, ∀u 6= v. (30)
This is shown by contradiction. Let us imagine that in the
weight allocation that maximizes (29) there exists some other
user u for which mu
φˆu
> mv
2φˆv
, where v is the user with the
largest mv/φˆv of that allocation. Then, if we increase mv by
δ and decrease mu by δ we have
d
dδ
∑
u∈Uo
φˆu log
(
φˆus
′
o
mu
)
= − φˆv
mv
+
φˆu
mu
> 0
and thus (29) increases, which contradicts our assumption that
(29) was already maximum. From (30) we have
mu =
φˆuso∑
u′∈Uo\{v}
φˆu + 2φˆv
, and mv =
2φˆvso∑
u′∈Uo\{v}
φˆu + 2φˆv
Combining this with (29) we obtain
Uo(w˜∗o)− Uo(w∗o) ≤
∑
u∈Uo\{v}
φˆu log
 ∑
u′∈Uo\{v}
φˆu + 2φˆv

+ φˆv log
1
2
∑
u′∈Uo\{v}
φˆu + 2φˆv

= log(1 + φˆv) + φˆv log(1/2)
If we now compute the φˆv that maximizes this expression
we obtain φˆv = 1log 2 − 1, and substituting this value
Uo(w˜∗o)− Uo(w∗o) ≤ − log(log 2)−
(
1
log 2
− 1
)
log 2
As mentioned at the beginning, the above bounds also applies
to Uo(w˜o)− Uo(wo).
The following lemma proves that the worst case envy is
lower bounded by 0.041.
Lemma 10. There exists a game instance for which Uo(w˜o)−
Uo(wo) = 0.041.
Proof. Let us consider a scenario with 2 base stations. Let slice
o have a share of so and one user at each base station with
priorities φ1 and φ2. Let the loads of the other slices in these
two base stations be a1 = 1 − so − xφ2so and a2 = xφ2so.
for a fixed x > 0 . Let so be sufficiently small such that
a1 > φ2so.
In this setting, the weights of slice o at each station are
given by
d11 =
soφ1
a1
a1+d11
φ1
a1
a1+d11
+ φ2
a2
a2+d12
, and d12 =
soφ2
a2
a2+d12
φ1
a1
a1+d11
+ φ2
a2
a2+d12
We distinguish the cases (i) x ≥ 1 and (ii) x < 1.
(i) For x ≥ 1, we consider slice o′ with share so′ = so with
priorities φ˜1 and φ˜2, where
φ˜1
φ˜2
=
φ1
φ2
a2−φ2so+d12
a2+d12
a1−φ1so+d11
a1+d11
We further consider a third slice with only one user in the first
base station with s3 = a1 − φ1so and a fourth slice with a
one user in the second base station with s4 = a2−φ2so. This
leads to d21 = φ1so and d
2
2 = φ2so.
If we now let so → 0,
d12 =
φ2xφ2so
φ1(xφ2so + d12) + φ2xφ2so
so = φ2
xφ2so
xφ2so + d12
so
From the above, d12 = xˆφ2so, where xˆ is the unique solution
to the equation x = (x+ xˆ)xˆ. Then, d11 = so − xˆφ2so. From
this, we have that in this case
Uo(w˜)− Uo(w) = φ1 log
(
φ1so
so − xˆφ2so
)
+ φ2 log
(
φ2so
xˆφ2so
)
= φ1 log
(
φ1
1− xˆ+ xˆφ1
)
− (1− φ1) log(xˆ)
(ii) In case that x < 1, we consider slice o′ has priorities
φ˜1 and φ˜2, where
φ˜1
φ˜2
=
φ1
φ2
a2−xφ2so+w2
a2+w2
a1−so−xφ2so+w1
a1+w1
which leads to w˜1 = (1 − xφ2)so and w˜2 = xφ2so. We
further consider a third slice in the first base station with
s3 = a1 − (1 − xφ2)so. If we now let so → 0, we have
the same expressions as above for w1 and w2, from which
Uo(w˜o)− Uo(wo) = φ1 log
(
so − xφ2so
so − xˆφ2so
)
+ φ2 log
(
xφ2so
xˆφ2so
)
= φ1 log
(
1− x+ xφ1
1− xˆ+ xˆφ1
)
− (1− φ1) log
(x
xˆ
)
By putting together the cases x ≥ 1 and x < 1, we can
obtain a lower bound for the worst-case envy by finding the
values of x and φ1 over x > 0 and φ1 ∈ [0, 1] that minimize
the following expressionφ1 log
(
φ1
1−xˆ+xˆφ1
)
− (1− φ1) log(xˆ), for x ≥ 1
φ1 log
(
1−x+xφ1
1−xˆ+xˆφ1
)
− (1− φ1) log
(
x
xˆ
)
, for x < 1
By performing the above search numerically, we find a
scenario with the following envy level:
Uo(w˜o)− Uo(wo) = 0.041
